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WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY?—
TAKING STOCK
BY VICTOR S. YARROS
OURS is not a purely scientific age. In the first place, scientific
men to-day are, as a rule, more modest than they were forty
or thirty years ago, and claim far less for Science, with a capital S,
than was the fashion during the last decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury. In the second place, and largely because of the limitations
frankly acknowledged by men of science, there has been of late a
veritable renascence of philosophy, if not of religion. Certain con-
ceptions and assumptions in the domain of the natural sciences are
so "idealistic" that the term "materialist" has lost its meaning.
Science itself, in a word, has destroyed that narrow, superficial ma-
terialism which once so aggressively claimed the sole right to con-
sider itself rational and scientific.
Once more, then, there is a field and a function for philosophy.
But it is becoming increasingly difficult for the earnest lay .inquirer
and student to find in current philosophical writing a clear and sound
definition of philosophy, and a satisfactory delimitation of its scope
and province.
We have been told again and again that philosophy to-day is
humble and does not pretend to explain the infinite and unknowable.
We have also been told that philosophy has become practical and
anxious to give aid in solving social and moral problems. We are
told, half facetiously and half seriously, by Professor Bertrand Rus-
sell and the Pragmatists, as well as by the Neo-Realists and the Criti-
cal Realists, that in the older systems of philosophy there was a
heavy admixture of humbug and barren dialectics. One is willing
to grant all this, especially if one remembers that science and theology
have also had their worthless ingredients. But the men who have
much to say on the negative and critical aspects of the subject have
strangely little to say on the simple, natural questions as to the mis-
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sion and field of the new, the pure, the modest and practical philoso-
phy. One sometimes douhts whether in the process of whittling
down, clearing away, rejecting and disavowing, the modern philoso-
phers have left themselves anything substantial and worthy of the
name.
Philosophy once dealt with ethical, psychological and ontological
problems. To-day it wisely leaves moral issues to the science of
ethics, questions in psychology to the science of psychology, meta-
physics to the professional metaphysicians, and so on. This policy
we can all praise unreservedly. What we cannot praise is the reti-
cence or silence of many philosophers on the type and kind of prob-
lems claimed by the philosopher as solely or peculiarly his. What
does he do which the sciences cannot do and do not undertake to do ?
What, in short, is his contribution as philosopher ?
Herbert Spencer, we may recall, regarded unification and syn-
thesis as the mission of philosophy. Each science, according to him,
solved certain problems and formulated certain laws and working
theories. None of the scientific specialists—and all men of science
are now specialists—attempt synthesis or unification ; if such tasks
are possible and profitable, some one not a specialist must attend to
them. That some one, Spencer held, was the philosopher. It is he
who co-ordinates, combines, harmonizes the respective conclusions of
the several sciences, and it is he who, in the light of his synthesis,
puts and answers certain questions not tackled by any science or
group of allied sciences.
This was a very alluring theory respecting the function and mis-
sion of philosophy. But, alas, facts have played with it. The
sciences have made wonderful progress since Spencer's day, but
where is the philosophic synthesis, the unification ? Spencer him-
self failed to produce any really synthetic philosophy ; for some of
his conclusions and convictions were too arbitrary and ascribable to
temperament, mental habits, prejudices and environmental influ-
ences, and not at all to strict logic working ol:)jectively in the domain
of science or philosophy. Spencer had definite views on politics,
economics, ethics, social organization, education, religion. Other
evolutionists, who started from the same premises as Spencer's biol-
ogy, psychology and other sciences, arrived at political, or economic,
or social, or moral conclusions radically, or totally, different from
his. This, obviouslv, could not happen if the several sciences really
imposed certain respective principles or deductions, and if the proper
union of those principles and deductions imposed a certain philosophy
of life and human conduct
!
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Spencer has few followers to-day as a philosopher. Some sort
of philosophical synthesis is longed for and dreamed of, to be sure,
but it is undeniable that those philosophers who claim to have made
the greatest advance and to have attracted the most converts among
instructed and cultivated men have refrained from encouraging such
hopes and dreams.
There has been, from one point of view, striking progress in
philosophy, but in what direction?
To answer this question, let us glance at the respective positions
of three modern and influential philosophers—the late William James,
Professor John Dewey and Professor Bertrand Russell.
James left no systematic, ambitious treatise on philosophy, but
no attentive student of his stimulating and fascinating books and
essays is in doubt concerning the essential elements of his philosophy.
Moreover, an excellent summary of it is appended bv Professor
Perry to his work on Present Philosophical Tendencies. In Professor
Perry's words, James, as a radical empiricist, a pluralist and a realist,
could not but "abandon the easier and more high-handed philosophy
of abstractions for the more difficult and less conclusive philosophy
of concrete particulars." To him, then, philosophy was "the study
of man as he works out his salvation." Keenly interested in human-
ly important problems, James "sought to answer for men the ques-
tions which exigencies of life led them to ask; and, where no certain
answer was to be had, he offered the prop of faith." His philosophy
"was his way of bringing men to the wisest belief which in their half-
darkness they can achieve."
But it is necessary to bear in mind that the salvation James con-
cerned himself with, the issues he faced, the faith he encouraged all
had to do with the ethical, spiritual and religious values of human
life. God, immortality, freedom, human destiny, truth, the nature
of knowledge, the relation of object and subject, or thing and idea,
the meaning of evil, the essence of good—these were the themes of
James' philosophy. Politics, economics, administration, organiza-
tion, mechanism, institutions interested James only insofar as they
embodied ideals derived from philosophy. Like Tolstoy, James re-
garded "the meaning of life" and the purpose of God as man's great-
est problems. In all this James, despite his strikingly original ideas
and style, remained true to philosophic tradition. He was not an
Agnostic in philosophy, any more than in religion. He sought his
answers in human experience and he did not admit that they could
be found outside of that experience. Pie staked everything on the
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right interpretation of human experience—rehgious. spiritual and
moral. To those who could not accept his interpretation he said
frankly that he had no "message" for them. He merely admonished
them to continue their search and their contemplation of experience-
He could not guarantee the supremacy or triumph of good ; God
was to him only "one of the claimants'" : the belief that the world is
divine may not be susceptible of scientific proof, but it is as likelv
to be true as not, and, in any case, it helps humanity in the effort to
make the world divine—that is, good.
Now, there is m.uch in James that is tonic and inspiring, but it if:
evident on reflection that what he offers is not a philosophy, but "a
second best," a provisional substitute for philosophy. Indeed, b^
implication James denies the possibility of a system of philosophy.
A few ideas al)out method, knowledge, mind, experience, function,
activity are not sufficient to build up a philosophy in the proper defi-
nition of the term. Perhaps no coherent, true philosophy is possible,
according to James, but he never said so.
We turn to Professor Dewey, who deals more fully and explicitly
with the subject.
Professor Dewey deals with the mission and function of philoso-
phy in several books, but nowhere more directly and elaborately than
in his popular volume on Reconstruction in PJiilosopIiy. According
to him, philosophy is not properly concerned, and cannot profitably
concern itself with "puzzles of epistemologv and the disputes between
realist and idealist, between plienomenalist and absolutist." It is, he
says, the preoccupations of modern philosophers with alien and empty
problems which have made that branch of knowledge and study "so
remote from the understanding of the everyday person and from the
results and processes of science." Facing l)oldly and scjuarelv the
question what would be left to philosophy were it to renounce and
abandon metaphysical and epistemologv tasks, Professor Dewey
writes in answer
:
"Would not the elimination of the traditional problems permit
philosophy to devote itself to a more fruitful and more needed task?
Would it not encourage philosophy to face the great social and moral
defects and troubles from which humanity suffers, to concentrate its
attention upon clearing up the causes and exact nature of these
evils and upon developing a clear idea of better social possibilities;
in short, upon projecting an idea or ideal which, instead of express-
ing the notion of another world or some far-away, unrealizable goal,
would be used as a method of understanding and rectifying specific
social ills?"
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That the foregoing statement is vague and incomplete, Professor
Dewey is prompt to admit. But he seeks to ampUfy and clarify it
by several "burning" illustrations. He refers to the world war, to
the antagonism between capital and labor, the conflicts between social
classes generally, the failure of the social sciences and the fine arts
to keep pace with the exact sciences, with technique, with physical
command of nature, and asks whether there be not to-day urgent
need of more fundamental enlightenment and guidance than we
possess—whether the time has not come to make a serious attempt^
—
by means and methods peculiar to philosophy—"to find an intelligent
substitute for blind custom and blind impulse as guides to life and
conduct."
We have sufficiently indicated Professor Dewey's mature view of
the province and mission of philosophy. Is it an altogether satisfac-
tory view ? Take his own illustrations. The question of war and
peace is primarily an ethical question. It is also a biological question.
It is, finally, a question of practical statesmanship, upon which his-
tory is capable of throwing much light. It is desirable to abolish
war? If so, is it possible to do so? If possible, what are the most
effective means to that end ? Why have men fought ; what have they
fought for ; what instrumentalities have they used to avoid war and
settle disputes peacefully ? Surely these questions will never be left
to the philosopher. As intimated, biologists, sociologists, psycho-
logists, moralists, theologians, economists, statesmen and writers of
government are severally seeking and giving answers to them. They
will continue to do so. If they shall fail to furnish the intelligent
guidance needed, how will the philosopher furnish it, and what will
be Jiis data and materials ? They cannot be different from those
available to, and employed by, the sciences just named. There is, by
the hypothesis we are discussing, no additional source of knowledge
and wisdom open to philosophers. What, then, is to be their particu-
lar contribution ?
Perhaps Professor Dewey implies—he does not say so explicitly
—that the philosopher will assimilate and use the information and
the inductions of all other sciences and build up a synthesis of his
own. If so, he consciously or unconsciously reverts to the Spen-
cerian idea of the task and business of philosophy, an idea, we repeat,
which has not "marched" either in theory or in practical life.
What has been said about the war-and-peace problem may also
be said about the capital-and-labor problem. Economists, moralists,
theologians, historians, engineers and—of late—even psychologists
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have been wrestling with that vexed and intricate question, and, as
we know, nothing Hke a concensus of opinion has as yet developed
even among advanced thinkers save, perhaps, to this extent—that the
present system, mainly competitive, will be superseded in the course of
time by a co-operative system largely if not entirely voluntary. Now,
what can the philosopher add here to our knowledge? He must do
what the humble lav person does—-read JMarx, ^fallock, Hyndman.
Kropotkine, Webb, Fabian literature, Cole, ct al, and attempt to find
a way of reconciling individualism with socialism, liberty with justice,
progress with stability, private judgment with social control. And
what are the chances of success in that attempt, or of agreement,
among philosophers? It is perfectly certain that some philosophers
will lean toward individualism, others toward Socialism, some toward
conservatism, others toward radicalism. Our last state will be no
better than our first. In addition to controversies among economists,
moralists, theologians, etc., we shall have controversies among eco-
nomists, moralists, theologians, etc., we shall have controversies
among self-styled philosophers, would-be builders of synthetic sys-
tems !
Professor Dewey, we fear, claims for the philosopher at once too
much and too little; too much, because Professor Dewey's philoso-
pher would have to master all the sciences, keep abreast of the leading
specialists and evolve a synthesis for the guidance of mankind ; too
little, because Professor Dewey's philosopher would have no corner,
no patch of his own, no set of questions definitely assigned to him
for investigation.
Yet Professor Dewey is most instructive and suggestive in that
part of his volume in which he emphasizes and drives home the fact
that "philosophy originated not out of intellectual material, but out
of social and emotional material" ; that "it has sprung from a clash
of social ends and from a conflict of inherited institutions with in-
compatible contemporary tendencies" : that under disguises and seem-
ing abstractions unrelated to reality it "has been occupied with the
precious values embedded in social traditions," and that the history
of philosophy must l)e studied "not as an isolated thing, but as a
chapter in the development of civilization and culture." It is cer-
tainly true—though often overlooked—tliat philosophy never really
confined itself to ultimate and absolute reality—whatever that may
be—or to things-in-themselves, or to entities above and beyond all
human experience. We moderns want philosophy to deal frankly
and directly with human experience, with reality, with the drama of
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existence, with the moral and spiritual forces and the intellectual con-
ceptions that produce that drama. But the question remains, has the
philosopher a corner of his own to occupy and illuminate, or is he a
sort of general manager, or chairman of the board of directors, in
the house of the sciences, the arts, the religions and the politico-social
systems of the world?
If a lay lover of philosophy may venture to express an opinion,
philosophy cannot afford to abdicate, to renounce all territorial
claims, to limit itself to the supervisory and co-ordinating function
simply and solely. The philosopher should indeed be wiser, broader
and more learned than any specialist. But he must in a sense, and
to some extent, he a specialist himself. He should know everything
about something that other savants neglect or study only superficially.
We must have problems specifically and particularly his.
Moreover, there can be but little doubt as to the type and kind
of problems that are philosophical in character. Man's relation to
the universe is essentially a philosophical problem, though man's
place in nature is primarily a biological problem. The test of
truth is a philosophical problem, and so is the nature and meaning
of reality. So is the "meaning of meaning," a subject about which
a remarkable work has just been written. Realists, Pragmatists,
Neo-Realists, Neo-Idealists, Critical Realists as well as unattached
thinkers and writers of ability and erudition are not open to censure
or ridicule for the subject-matter of their investigations or the meth-
ods they adopt. They have not strayed from their proper province
;
they are at home, engaged in the work assigned to them by tradition,
by reason, by scientific classification of the activities of the human
mind.
And assuredly the prol:)lems just specified as being strictly and
unmistakably philosophical are not divorced from life, not empty,
not trivial, not imaginary. They are, on the contrary, problems
which even common sense now recognizes as possessing significance
and sustaining vital relations to morals, religion, economics and poli-
tics. As to science, what specialist absorbed in biological, psychologi-
cal, geological, anthropological, historical or other problems ever stops
to consider the questions above defined as philosophical ? On the
contrary, the scientific specialists eagerly disclaim any competence or
disposition to deal with those matters. They must be studied and
discussed and settled by philosophers, if at all. And it is perfectly
safe to say that they will be studied by the philosophers of all schools,
though perhaps not in the same way, or under the same method.
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It is gratifying to note that Professor Bertrand Russell, the icono-
clast in philosophy, as in politico-social speculation, takes substantially
the same view as we have just expressed, even though he. too, may
be charged with unduly narrowing in one respect the scope and mis-
sion of philosophy. IMr. Russell is one of the thinkers who. to use
the words of another philosopher, give mathematics "a sort of cen-
tral position in philosophic speculation." He has been greatly im-
pressed by. and has aided in furthering, the use of mathematics by,
and the penetration of methematics into, philosophic studies and
modes of approach. In a sense, therefore, Mr. Russel's views of the
subject we are discussing in this paper are even more interesting than
those of Professor Dewev or of William James. In dealing with the
ideas of the school of mathematical philosophers we have a feeling of
thorough-going modernity and of intimacy with the scientific spirit.
And what does Mr. Russell tell us in regard to the jurisdiction and
proper claims of philosophy ? This, in the briefest possible but rigor-
ouslv correct summarv
:
That the true aim of philosophy is a "theoretical understanding
of the world" ; that philosophy is a highly refined, highlv civilized
pursuit, whose objects are "strange, unusual and remote" ; that phil-
osophy can do nothing to satisfy our more human desires, or to help
demonstrate our world has this or that "desiral)le ethical ch.iracter-
istic; that the differences between good and bad are not sufficiently
abstract to come within the province of philosophy ; that love and
hate are, from the philosophers' viewpoint, closely analogous attitudes
toward an object; that while a vague sort of ethical interest may
prompt philosophers they must beware of any ethical bias and take
care to keep the results sought by their studies free from any ethical
admixture ; that philosophy must not hope to find any answer to the
practical problems of life, but content itself with dry and abstract
issues; that its hopes are "purely intellectual," and based on the
ultimate intrinsic value in the contemplation of truth ; that philos-
ophers must acquire the disinterested intellectual curiosity which dis-
tinguishes the genuine man of science.
How different, how startlingly different, these ideas are from
those of James or of Professor Dewey ! What is the poor lavman
to think in the presence of such disagreements and contradictions
!
But on one point Mr. Russell is staunchly orthodox. Philosophy,
he says, must have a province of its own and aim at results which the
other sciences can neither prove nor disprove; it must consist of
propositions which could not even occur to the other sciences. The
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essence of philosophy is logic, and it is modern logic—one part of
which merges into mathematics—which has rendered philosophic dis-
cussion scientific and significant.
The foregoing requires no elaborate comment. Mr. Russell,
though hoping for much from the new conception, the new start, in
philosophy, promises little of a tangible character. He has scant re-
spect for philosophic stocks—traditions, postulates, ideas—if, indeed,
any stocks are left on the shelves after decades of mutually destruc-
tive criticism by the philosophers themselves. What he is certain of
is that, at last, philosophy can forge ahead with confidence. What
its field is, however, Mr. Russell does not tell us in clear language.
He has definite ideas as to what philosophy cannot and should not
undertake to do, but he gives us no definite idea as to what that branch
of science and knowledge can and should endeavor to do. He is sure
the philosophic output of the future, provided methematics and logic
control it, will be excellent, dependable and enduring, but he is vague
concerning the nature and complexion of the product to be offered
to the world by philosophers of the right school. Perhaps he is not
willing to commit himself too far, seeing that the present period is
one of transition and reconstruction in philosophy. Be this as it
may, the lay student and the general public, who are being urged
constantly to cultivate philosophy and encourage it by seeking its
guidance and marrying it to life, will be more intrigued by Mr. Rus-
sell than enlightened.
The educated and reflective lay public has never doubted the fact
that philosophy deserves a place in the sun. It has never doubted
that philosophy aims to minister to the higher needs of man. But
it is watchfully awaiting developments in philosophy, especially the
emergence of a consensus of opinion as to the mission, function and
exact province of philosophy.
